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  I 
Abstract 
Unmarried fertility was a lot lower in the 1970s than in the 1990s. It was also the case 
that  unmarried  mothers  had  much  lower  marriage  rates  than  non-mothers,  a 
differential that has largely vanished over time. Could this marriage-market penalty 
have been strong enough to explain why unmarried fertility rates were lower then? To 
explore  this  issue,  we  introduce  a  new  model  of  fertility  and  marriage,  based  on 
directed search. Relative to the existing literature, the essential contributions of the 
model  are  to  allow  for  accumulation  of  children  over  the  lifecycle  and  for  the 
marriage of single mothers. We use the model, in conjunction with US survey data, to 
explore the impact of marital prospects on the fertility decisions of unmarried women. 
We find that the decline, from the 1970s to 1995, in marriage rates of unmarried 
women with no children, can account for the dramatic rise in unmarried women’s 
share of births over that period. 
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iv1I n t r o d u c t i o n
"But step-families are diﬀerent. The stepparent has shopped for a spouse, not a child; the
child is a cost that comes as part of the deal...step-parenthood is the strongest risk factor
for child abuse ever identiﬁed".
–Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works, 1997
According to the US census, about 50% of marriages now involve a spouse who has been previously
married, and 30% of U.S. children are not living with both parents. These two facts represent a rapid
shift of actual demographic behavior away from the standard represented in economic marriage models,
where marriage occurs once and parenthood, if included at all, is restricted to married couples.
While fertility decline and rising divorce rates among married couples are among the behavioral
shifts driving these trends, shifts in the behavior of singles, such as declining marriage rates and rising
fertility rates, appear to be more important, according to Ventura and Bachrach (2000). It seems
plausible therefore that at least part of this transformation is driven by equilibrium considerations;
marital prospects are likely to play a strong role in the fertility decisions of single women, and behavior
when married is likely to be increasingly inﬂuenced, as divorce and re-marriage become more frequent,
by the prospect of a return to the marriage market.
In this paper we provide a simple model of the role of these marital prospects on both married and
single fertility. The mechanism underlying our marriage market model is directed search; men decide
which type of women to court, where by "type" we mean the number of children a woman already has.
Single men prefer women without children, but competition for wives reduces both the probability of
marriage and the husband’s share of the surplus, so some may choose to court single mothers. Women
without children therefore attract more suitors, marry at a higher rate, and get more surplus within
marriage. They face therefore a disincentive for unmarried fertility whose strength is increasing in the
gains from marriage.1
Relative to the previous marriage literature, the main contribution is that our model can allow
for arbitrarily high numbers of children and transitions in and out of marriage. This means it is
relatively straightforward to match our model to annual data and thus measure the importance of
these interactions.
We provide an application of our model to demonstrate this feature; a numerical analysis of the
change in marital regime between 1973 and 1995. In our empirical section, we analyze the 1973 and
1This is consistent with the empirical results of Rosenzweig (1999), which ﬁnds that a fall in marital prospects
signiﬁcantly raises the chances that young US women will choose non-marital fertility.
11995 waves of the National Survey of Family Growth. By estimating probit regressions for marriage and
giving birth, we are able to show that neither the decline of marriage rates nor the rise in unmarried birth
rates can be attributed to shifting education patterns, age distribution or tendency to cohabitation. We
use the estimates from 1973 to calibrate the model; the calibration exploits the diﬀerence in marriage
rates between mothers and non-mothers to identify the importance of marital prospects in marriage.
The results show that the model can generate a close match, not only to the statistical targets, but
also to some important non-targeted moments.
The model’s free parameters include preference shocks that shift the average marriage rate, as
well as the marriage penalty for single mothers, without aﬀecting the directly aﬀecting the payoﬀs for
fertility. We can therefore isolate the eﬀect on fertility of the decline from the 1970s to the 1990s in the
marriage rates for non-mothers by re-setting these parameters to generate the marriage and divorce
rates of the 1990s. In the benchmark model, this change results in a signiﬁcant increase in birth rates
to unmarried women, and can explain virtually all of the increase in the unmarried share of total births.
Of course this exercise can not explain why the change in marriage patterns might have occurred,
only that they are suﬃcient to explain the rise of unmarried fertility. A related paper in progress,Kennes
and Knowles (2011) extends the model presented here to consider the search for sexual partners, and
asks whether improved contraception for single women can explain the transition in marital patterns. In
the current model, by contrast, improved birth-control generates very little change in marital patterns,
and the unmarried birth rates fall rather than rise.
While there is a large literature on the determinants of unmarried parenthood, very few published
papers consider the impact on marriage-market equilibria posed by the choice between fertility inside
and outside of marriage. Most papers that consider fertility in the context of marriage-market equilibria
assume fertility is either exogenous, as in Weiss and Willis (1997) or occurs within marriage only, or
both, as in Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000) and Chiappori and Weiss (2006). In that sense
this paper is more closely related to Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) and Chiappori and Oreﬃce
(2008)which model pre-marital fertility. Greenwood and Guner (2005) models the segregation of young
singles into sexually promiscuous and abstinent groups in response to improvements in contraception
technology. All of the latter papers however abstract from married fertility decisions.
Among the few equilibrium models that consider both margins of fertility, there isNeal (2004),
which examines the interaction between welfare payments and marriage-market equilibria that diﬀer
in unmarried fertility rates, Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2000) (GGK hereafter), which shows
how marriage-market dynamics and human-capital investment perpetuate the eﬀect of rising welfare
payments on unmarried fertility.2 An important feature of these papers is that they model, inter
2The theoretical framework underlying Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2000) is developed in Greenwood, Guner,
2alia, the impact of pre-marital fertility on the household allocations of married couples through the
mechanism of marriage-market equilibrium. However these papers suﬀer however from an extreme
compression of the lifecycle; only GGK allows for divorce and remarriage, but even there, marriage is
only allowed in two periods and divorce only in one.
The exception to the rule is Regalia and Ríos-Rull (1999) , which develops a life-cycle model to
analyze the impact of wage inequality on marriage, divorce and fertility. That paper does allow for
both fertility margins, keeps track of previous children, and allows for a random-search style of marriage
equilibrium. However the focus there is on wage inequality and heterogeneity, which is outside the scope
of the current paper.
In the search-and-matching literature, models with repeated matching opportunities are entirely
standard, however this is typically achieved by abstracting from choices, such as investment, that
permanently change the state of an agent. In the marriage-market model of Chade and Ventura (2005),
for instance, based on the job-search framework of Burdett and Wright (1998), agents experience
an inﬁnite succession of marriages and divorces in response to changes in match quality, which is
represented by an iid random variable. The matching literature has also considered the analysis of
marriage markets with ex-ante heterogeneous agents, as in Burdett and Coles (1997), where agents
sort into marriages on the basis of quality diﬀerences which are assumed to be permanent. Recently
the literature has begun to consider matching with pre-marital investments, as in Burdett and Coles
(2001), but that literature does not consider the margin between investments inside and outside the
match, which is the mathematical analog of the fertility decision in the current paper.3
2E m p i r i c a l B a c k g r o u n d
The decline in marriage rates is well-documented phenomenon; for a cohort analysis, see Schoen and
Standish (2001), who show that female marriage rates declined from about 25% per year for women
aged 20-25 in the 1946-50 birth cohort, to 10% per year for the corresponding women in the 1969-73
birth cohort. In ﬁgure 1 we show a similar result for age-marriage proﬁles at annual frequencies, based
on the U.S. Census; the marriage rate at age 25 declines from above 20% to about 8% from oldest to
youngest cohort.
Casual empirical evidence for the basic mechanism in the model comes from the lower marriage rates
and Knowles (2003). Two closely-related papers that use a similar framework are Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002)
and Guner and Knowles (2008).
3A related literature on matching with pre-marital investments, such as Iyigun and Walsh (2007), does not allow for
the investment to take place after marriage, and so cannot account for variation over time in the timing of investments
like fertility.
3of single mothers, the lower share of the marriage output allocated to single mothers when they do
marry and a host of anecdotes across many cultures illustrating the tension between children and step
parents (see Pinker (1999) for a summary)4.Beaujouan (2009) ﬁnds that re-partnering rates in France
are signiﬁcantly lower for single mothers than for child-less women or single men with or without
children. She shows however that this asymmetry between men and women is entirely accounted for
by the fact that single mothers are much more likely to live with the children than are single males.
Similarly Browning and Bonke (2006) ﬁnd that having children from a previous marriage does not
reduce the intra-household allocation to Danish husbands in subsequent marriages, but has a strong
negative eﬀect on the allocation for wives. Again the explanation appears likely to be co-residence of
mothers with their children, although the survey lacks the variables required to test this hypothesis.
Despite such disincentives, the fraction of U.S. births accounted for by unmarried women has risen
steadily, from 5% in 1945 to 40% in 2009, according to Ventura (2009). They show that there has been
steady growth in the unmarried birth rate since 1940, and in the unmarried share of births since at
least 1960. This latter increase has proceeded at roughly the same rate in all age groups from 15-17 to
30-34, though the timing of the change is later in the older groups.
Since 1980, cohabitation has played an increasingly important role, but in 1990-95, according to
Ventura (2009), only 39% of unmarried births were to cohabiting women, so the majority were to
women who were neither married nor cohabiting. The fraction of children who live with cohabiting
parents remains extremely low; even in 2010, according to the Current Population Survey, unmarried
parents with children constituted only 2.1% of households.5
Of course the population of unmarried women has changed in other ways over time, with the rise
of women’s college education and the aging of the baby boom, as well as divorce and cohabitation. To
isolate the changes in marriage and fertility rates from the composition eﬀects, it is necessary to use
regression methods on micro data. In this section we compare the behavior of unmarried women in
two waves of the National Survey of Family Growth, 1973 and 1995, which have complete fertility and
marital histories for samples of women aged 15-44 at the time of the survey.
While the 1995 wave was designed to be representative of the US population as a whole, the 1973
wave excluded never-married women with no cohabiting own children6.W er e w e i g h tt h i ss u r v e yb y( 1 )
4Pinker: In one study of emotionally healthy middle-class families in the U.S., only half of the stepfathers and a
quarter of the stepmothers claimed to have "parental feelings" toward their step-children.
5Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2010 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Table
FG10.
6The sample design for 1973 was described as follows: 9,797 women aged 15-44 living in the coterminous United
States who were either currently married, previously married, or never married but had oﬀspring living in the household
in 1973.
4using the 1970 Census to create dummy observations for these excluded women by age and education
level, so that the proportions of these women in each cell match the 1970 census, and (2) reweighting
the survey observations to account for the women excluded from the population in the denominator.
Figure 2 shows that this procedure results in a very close match between the Census and the reweighted
NSFG sample for all the age-education groups. Deviations are most noticeable for the smallest cells,
where the fraction of unmarried women with children in the original sample is most vulnerable to
sampling error.
In Figure 3 we show that whether we include cohabitation as singles or not has little impact on the
average behavior of singles; in the top panel, marriage rates are plotted against the number of children.
The bottom panel shows that births per year is much higher for cohabitants, but because of their small
number in 1995, relative to the large mass of singles who did not have children, they do to little to
shift the plots of singles. Of course the same argument applies to 1973, when the cohabitation rate was
much lower.
We estimate probit regressions by month for the birth of a child, and for marriage, for 1970-73 and
1990-95 (these date ranges correspond to periods for which the surveys collected extra variables). Earlier
surveys did not interview single women, and so are not useful for this purpose. The regression equations
include dummy variables to control for whether the woman is cohabiting, whether she was previously
married and whether she graduated from high school, attended college or attained a bachelor’s degree.7
The resulting estimates are presented in Table 3. In the 1970s, having a child has a strong positive
association with the probability of a future childbirth (estimate=0.758), and a strong negative associ-
ation (-0.41) with future marriage. To put this in perspective, the eﬀect of college graduation is quite
small by comparison: (-0.39 for births and -0.27 for marriages). The eﬀects of cohabitation are large
(1.1 for births and -2.96 for marriages), but the rate of cohabitation is negligible in the 1973 survey.
The marginal eﬀects of additional children tend to be signiﬁcantly smaller, except for 5 or more kids,
where sampling error and selection are likely to confound the interpretation of the estimates.
In 1995, the eﬀect of children on future births has shrunk to a third of its former size, and that
on marriages has practically vanished to zero. The cohabitation eﬀects are also tiny by comparison
with the 1970s. While the impact of a college degree on births is still strongly negative, the eﬀect on
marriage has also faded to zero.
In Figure 4 we show projected age proﬁles using the estimated coeﬃcients. The ﬁgure compares
7The 1973 wave does not record wether the responded is attending school, nor her eventual attainment. Instead we
know her years of schooling completed. We assume she is not attending if her age exceeds years of schooling by 6 years
or more, while we use thresholds of 12 and 16 years as proxies for high-school graduation and attained of a bachelors
degree, respectively.
5women with no children to those with one child already. In both cases the comparison is for women
with a diploma but no college attendance. It is apparent from panel (a) that marriage rates for women
without children fell considerably; the marriage hazard rate at age 22 declined from 30% per year to
about 12%, while panel (b) shows virtually no change for single mothers. With regards to birth rates,
those of childless women aged 22 quadrupled, from 2% to 8% annually, while for single mothers, the
birth rates fell signiﬁcantly, from 18% for 22 years old, to 13%.
These ﬁgure indicate that neither trends in education nor in cohabitation can explain away the dra-
matic rise in unmarried fertility since the 1970s the change in behavior within the education/age/cohabitation
cells is an important component of the overall change. Analogous results for married women’s fertility
are reported in the appendix (Tables A2 and A3). Those tables show that fertility proﬁles for married
women, conditional on zero or one child, have been relatively stable.
3A L i f e - C y c l e M o d e l o f F e r t i l i t y a n d M a r r i a g e
The population of agents consists of inﬁnitely-lived adults, with a continuum of each sex denoted by
{M,F} and mass NM and NF. Life is divided into discrete periods. Women are of sex f and may
produce up to K children.
There are three types of households; single males, single females, and married couples. Married
adults live together as husband and wife with all the children ever born to the female spouse.
Each period, couples experience random shocks to the quality e q of the marriage, which consist of
utility ﬂows to each spouse. Households exit permanently from active status, i.e. "become sterile"
with probability   each period; we assume they then enjoy their current utility ﬂow forever. They are
replaced by an equal inﬂow of unmatched men and child-less women.
Let k be the number of kids in a married-couple household, and km  k be the number of the
husband’s biological (own) kids. Children are born to women at rate ⇡Feach period. The cost of
reducing the fertility rate ⇡F below a baseline fertility rate b ⇡mF
k is given by the function ⇥
 
⇡F|b ⇡mF
k
 
,
where m indicates the marital status and k the parity (number of children to date) of the woman.
3.1 Preferences
The indirect utility functions e uSM, e uSF (k) and e uM (k,km),f o r ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,s i n g l em a l e s ,s i n g l ew o m e n
and married-couples, to represent the maximized utility ﬂow each period from consumption and chil-
dren. The critical assumption is that children generate more utility within a marriage than without:
e uSF (k +1 )  e uSF (k) < e uM (k +1 ,k m   1)   e uM (k,km)
6What we have in mind here is the idea that parents get less utility from step children than from
their own children, so that an additional child within a marriage raises the father’s utility more than
ap r e - e x i s t i n gc h i l dw o u l d . W ea l s of o l l o wA i y a g a r i ,G r e e n w o o d ,a n dG u n e r( 2 0 0 0 )a n dm a n yo t h e r
papers in assuming that children outside the household do not enter the parent’s utility function.
Utility within married couples is perfectly transferable. This means that utility of the couples can
be traded oﬀ on a one-for-one basis. Assuming full commitment, therefore, all allocations of the surplus
can be eﬃciently achieved by maximizing the equally-weighted sum of the welfare of husband and wife.
The stochastic process for match quality e q is assumed to contain both a persistent component
q 2 Q ⌘
 
q1,q 2,....qNq
 
and an iid component " 2 R.F o rn e wm a r r i a g e s ,t h ep r o c e s sf o rq is indexed
by ¯ q 2 Q.
Fertility decisions are made after the match quality has been realized. Computational considerations
restrict the persistent component to a discrete support, so the iid component of the process is a
computational convenience that allows for a continuous support for match quality, which is critical for
comparative statics.
3.2 Frictional assignment
Transitions between household types occur through marriage and divorce. Marriage occurs through a
directed-search matching mechanism based on Julien, Kennes, and King (2000). We refer to the pool
of all single males and females as the "marriage market" ; this consists of new entrants and those who
were single or became divorced last period and remain active this period. The number of single-female
households with k children is denoted by NF (k). We also assume that while entry into the marriage
market is costless for women, there is an entry cost  >0 that single men must pay.
Each period there is random matching within K +1marriage sub-markets, one for each type of
single woman. For each sub-market k,t h en u m b e ro fw o m e ni sd e n o t e dNF (k).S u p p o s e t h e r e a r e
NM (k) men who enter marriage markets of type k. Let the ratio of men to women in sub-market k,i e
the “queue length” for market k be denoted  k ⌘ NM (k)/NF (k) .
At the beginning of the period, each single man (“suitor”) is randomly assigned to a woman within
the market he has chosen. Each single woman therefore starts the period with k children and an integer
number of suitors z. The probability distribution over z is given by !z (k),a n dw o m e na u c t i o nt h e
match to the highest bidder. The probability that the husband receives the surplus is therefore !0 (k),
the probability that he was the only entrant, while the probability that the woman matches is given
by 1   !0 (k), the probability that she has at least one suitor. A man will match with probability 1/z,
which on average is equal to
 
1   e  k 
/ k. A newly matched couple learns the ﬁrst realization of their
7marriage quality (q,") , at which point they decide whether to marry. If they do not marry, they split
up and spend the remainder of the period as single households.
3.3 Expected payoﬀs
Since utility is transferable, decisions within the marriage, such as fertility and divorce, maximize the
expected surplus, contingent on (k,km) and the current values of the match-quality variables, (q,").
It is convenient to divide each period into the stage before and the stage after marital events. Let the
values on entering the period, for men and women, respectively, be denoted V E
SM (k, ) and V E
SF (k, ),
where k denotes the sub-market the single person is participating in. Let Y E (k,km|q 1), denote the
expected value, on entering the period, of a marriage consisting of a woman with k kids of her own, of
which km are children of her current husband, conditional on q 1,t h ep r e v i o u s - p e r i o d ’ sr e a l i z a t i o no f
q.
Let the eﬀective discount rate be denoted ˜   ⌘   (1    ). Finally, let EU
 
⇡F,k,k M
 
represent the
expected utility in each period, net of the quality ﬂow and conditional on fertility choice ⇡F :
EU
 
⇡
F,k,k M
 
⌘ ⇡
FuM (k +1 ,k M +1 )+
 
1   ⇡
F 
uM (k,kM)   ⇥
 
⇡
F 
Let Y R (k,km|q,") be the value of the marriage, given optimal fertility decisions, after the match
quality shocks (q,") are realized but before the fertility realizations. We can write this in terms of the
ﬂows we have just deﬁned as:
Y
R (k,km|q,") = max
⇡F {EU
 
⇡
F,k,k M
 
+ q + " (1)
+ e  
⇥
⇡
FY
E (k +1 ,k m +1 |q)+
 
1   ⇡
F 
Y
E (k +1 ,k m +1 |q)
⇤o
. The alternative to any given marriage is to remain single for the period. Let V R
SM ( ) and V R
SF (k, )
denote the continuation values as singles for men and women, respectively, at the close of the marriage
market.
3.3.1 The Divorce Rule
We assume that the divorce rule "⇤ (k,km,q) maximizes the present discounted value of the spouses:
Y
E (k,km,q  1)
= max
"⇤
(ˆ
q
"ˆ "⇤(k,kM,q)
 1
⇥
V
R
SM + V
R
SF (k)
⇤
d (")
#
df (q|q 1)
+
ˆ
q
ˆ 1
"⇤(k,kM,q)
Y
R (k,km|q,")d (")
 
df (q|q 1)
 
(2)
8, where the equal weighting of the spouses follows from the transferable utility assumption. As a
convenience, we can write the divorce probability arising from the optimal divorce decision rule as:
⇡
D
k,km (q 1)=
ˆ
q
F ("
⇤ (k,kM,q))d (")df (q|q 1) (3)
.
3.3.2 New Marriages
We can now deﬁne the surplus from a new marriage where the bride has k children as:
S (k,0) ⌘ Y
E (k,0|q 1)   V
R
SF (k)   V
R
SM
.G i v e nt h a tam a nh a sp r o b a b i l i t y!0 ( k) of getting the marital surplus, the ex ante net value of a
man’s prospects in marriage market k is given by
V
E
SM (k)=V
R
SM + !0 ( k)S (k,0) (4)
3.3.3 Singles
Recalling the deﬁnition of the value functions, we can write the ex post continuation value for single
men as:
V
R
SM = max
k
 
uSM +  V
E
SM (k)
 
(5)
. Similarly for single women with k children, the ex ante net value of entering the marriage market is:
V
E
SF (k)=V
R
SF (k, ) + [1   !0 ( k)   !1 ( k)]S (k,0) (6)
.L e t t i n g t h e f u n c t i o n EUSF (k)=
 
1   ⇡SF
k
 
uSF (k)+⇡SF
k uSF (k +1 ) ,t h e nI f⇡SF
k is the optimal
fertility probability, the ex post continuation values for single women are:
V
R
SF (k)=EU
SF (k)   ⇥
 
⇡
SF
k |b ⇡
SF
k
 
(7)
+ 
⇥ 
1   ⇡
SF
k
 
V
E
SF (k)+⇡
SF
k V
E
SF (k +1 )
⇤
(8)
3.4 Fertility Decisions
Having a child changes the state of the household. The net beneﬁt of having a child therefore depends
on the forecast of the probability of marital transitions, which for married couples depends on the
current value of q.F o ra n yf u n c t i o ng (k),l e t g (k)=g (k +1 )  g (k) represent the eﬀect of having
9one more child. Let the optimal fertility choices be denoted by ⇡SF
k for single women, and by ⇡MF
k,km for
married couples. At interior solutions, the ﬁrst-order conditions for fertility are then
⇥
0  
⇡
SF
k
 
=  uSF (k)+  (1    ) V
E
SF (k, ) (9)
for single women with fewer than K kids, and
⇥
0  
⇡
MF
k,km
 
=  uM (k,km)+ 
⇥
 Y
E (k,km| ,q)
⇤
(10)
for married women. Corner solutions (maximum fertility) are possible, as we will assume that the
technology can only be used to reduce fertility.
3.5 Market-Clearing: Determination of  k
As in the example, the current model has two types of equilibria; one where the free-entry condition
binds and single men are in excess supply, and one where the resource constraint binds, and the free-
entry condition does not.
Let M be the set of active marriage markets of type k. We deﬁne the men’s participation constraint
as the requirement that in any active sub-market of type k , men receive the same expected payoﬀ:
V
E
SM (k, )=V
R
SM ( )+  8k 2M (11)
If men were to receive less than this in sub-market k then entry would be suboptimal, so the sub-market
would be inactive. If men were to receive more, then more men would enter sub-market k,i m p l y i n g
that   was not the equilibrium vector.
The free-entry condition is that the value of being a single man in the equilibrium with marriage
markets is at least as great as the value of autarky:
V
R
SM ( )   V
A
SM (12)
.
If in equilibrium free-entry condition binds, then the continuation value V R
SM equals the autarky
value V A
SM =
uSM
 (1  ). Now suppose that single men strictly prefer entry into active marriage markets.
Another way to think of this is that there is excess demand for husbands; the supply constraint binds.
This constraint is
X
k
NM (k)  NM (13)
10Given our assumption that the match surplus is declining in k,t h e r ei ss o m ek⇤ 2{ 0,1,...K} such
that in equilibrium  k > 0 if k  k⇤ and  k =0otherwise. Using the deﬁnition of queue length, we
can write the supply constraint as:
X
kk⇤
 kNF (k)=
X
kk⇤
NM (k)=NM
.S i n c et h em a r k e t - c l e a r i n gi m p l i e st h a t k is decreasing in V R
SM,t h e ni ti se a s yt os o l v ef o re q u i l i b r i u m
by increasing V R
SM from the autarky level until this constraint holds with equality. In practice the fact
that annual marriage rates are low and the supply of men and women roughly equal overall, implies
that some men must be sitting out of the market, so the ﬁrst sort of equilibrium is the more relevant.
3.6 Equilibrium
We summarize the model with a formal deﬁnition of the stationary equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 As t a t i o n a r ye q u i l i b r i u mo ft h ed i r e c t e d - s e a r c hm a r r i a g em a r k e tw i t ham a x i m u mk i d s
K consists of the following objects: a list of decision rules for fertility ⇡SF
k ,⇡MF
k,km,a n dd i v o r c er u l e s
"⇤ (k,km,q) al i s to fe x - p o s tv a l u ef u n c t i o n sV R
SM and V R
SF (k)for singles and Y R (k,km,q) for married,
al i s to fd i s t r i b u t i o n sNF (k),M(k,km,q),al i s to fq u e u e - l e n g t h s{ k}
K
k=0 for and a law of motion
T (k,km,Q) for the distributions. This list must satisfy the following conditions:
1. Optimality:
(a) The fertility decision rules are solutions to the individual optimization problems (9) and (10),
(b) the divorce thresholds "⇤ (k,km,q) set the marriage surplus to zero.
(c) For each k, the value functions solve the the system of equations (1),(5),
2. Market-clearing: the market tightness vector { k}
K
k=0 satisﬁes these conditions:
(a) Feasibility: the supply constraint (13) is satisﬁed.
(b) Free entry: the free entry condition (12) is satisﬁed for all markets where  k > 0
3. Aggregation: The laws of motion of the distributions satisfy:
(a) Consistency: The laws of motion are generated by the individual decisions.
(b) Stationarity: The distributions are the ﬁxed points of their laws of motion.
.
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The decision rules in market k depend on the other markets k0 <konly through the values of  k and
V R
SM, while those with k0 >kalso determine the value of transiting to a new state. Therefore we can
solve the asset equations for each level of k separately, conditional on conjectured values of
 
 k,VR
SM
 
,
by backwards induction from k = K .G i v e nt h ec o m p l e t es y s t e mo fd e c i s i o nr u l e s ,w et h e ns o l v ef o r
steady-state distributions, starting from k =0 ,s i n c et h ed i s t r i b u t i o na tl e v e lk is not aﬀected directly
by the system at k0 >k . This yields new values of
 
 0... K,VR
SM
 
implied by the market-clearing
conditions. We then repeat the procedure using the new values until they converge.
This sequential procedure works because the only transition we allow in k is to increase by one.To
ensure that this procedure converges quickly, we hold ﬁxed the markets that are active. Letting k⇤  K
indicate the highest market that is open, we start from k⇤ =0and apply the solution procedure for
successively higher values of k⇤ until we get either k⇤ = K or  k⇤+1 =0 .
4.1 Asset Equations
To solve the asset equations for a given level of k,w es o l v ef o rt h ep o l i c yr u l e s
 
⇡D (k,km,q),⇡F (k,km,q)
 nq
q=1 ,
and the surplus vector {S (k,0,q)}
nq
q=1.S u p p o s et h a tm a r r i a g em a r k e tk is active. Let’s assume that
we know the value functions for k +1 ,t h ef e r t i l i t ya n dd i v o r c ep r o b a b i l i t i e sf o r{(k,qi)}
nq
i=1 and the
ex post value V R
SM of being a single male.8 These assumptions allow us to write the asset equations
relevant to the marriage market for women with k children as the following linear system:
2
6 6 6 6 6
4
V E
SF (k)
Y E (k,0,q 1)
...
Y E  
k,0,q nq
 
3
7 7 7 7 7
5
= A1k
2
6 6 6 6 6
4
V E
SF (k)
Y E (k,0,q 1)
...
Y E  
k,0,q nq
 
3
7 7 7 7 7
5
+ A0k (14)
. The elements of A1k and A0k are derived in the appendix. Note that this system is independent of
the value of being a family with k children and km > 0, because those outcomes have zero probability
for these women. However, the value of a (k,km > 0) family depends on the value of being single with
k children, so with the solution to (14) in hand we then solve a second, smaller linear system for the
values of these families:
2
6 6
4
Y E (k,km,q 1)
...
Y E  
k,km,q nq
 
3
7 7
5 = B1k
2
6 6
4
Y E (k,km,q 1)
...
Y E  
k,km,q nq
 
3
7 7
5 + B0k (15)
The elements of B1k and B0k are derived in the appendix.
8Note that the transitory shock " is not part of the state vector.
124.2 Distributions
Using the marriage and fertility decision rules derived above, we can easily infer the laws of motion and
then compute the steady-state distributions of the household types. Within each level of k we solve
separately for the households with km =0and those with km > 0.
Let the next-period mass of the singles and married at each state be given by N0
F (k) and M0 (k,km,q),
respectively. We show in the appendix that we can write the law of motion T (k,0,Q) of the distribution
of singles and marriages with km =0as the linear system:
2
6 6
6 6 6
4
N0
F (k)
M0 (k,0,q 1)
...
M0  
k,0,q nq
 
3
7 7
7 7 7
5
= C1k
2
6 6
6 6 6
4
NF (k)
M (k,0,q 1)
...
M
 
k,0,q nq
 
3
7 7
7 7 7
5
+ C0k (16)
, where the elements of B and bk
1 are derived in the appendix. This linear system is easily solved for
the stationary values.
For any k>0, we ﬁrst have to solve for the stationary distributions of married couples with km > 0.
This is the ﬁxed point of the linear system deﬁned by T (k,km,Q):
M
0 (k,km,Q)=D1k,kmM (k,km,Q)+D0k,km (17)
Because any increase in km entails an increase in k, the law of motion for each diﬀerent value of km
forms a separate linear system of equations that depends on behavior at k   1;u n l e s skm > 0,t h e
behavior of women with k children is not required to solve these equations.
4.3 Market-Clearing
The equilibrium solution can be reduced to the appropriate choice of the ex post value for men, V R
SM.
Using equations (4) and (11), it is clear that
V
R
SM ( )   V
A
SM = !0 ( k)S (k,0)    
Taking our guess onV R
SM as given, we can easily solve this for the queue length as a function of the
surplus:
 k =  log(!0)=l o g
 
V
R
SM   V
A
SM +  /(S (k,0))
 
There is no guarantee that the free-entry condition is solved by a positive  k in every market. In those
markets where the solution would require  k < 0,t h en o n - n e g a t i v i t yc o n s t r a i n tb i n d s ;t h e s em a r k e t s
do not operate, as men prefer to enter another market or to remain single. In any case, this equation
13implies the queue-length vector, so we can compute the distributions and hence the supply and demand
for single men. We start by setting V R
SM = V A
SM ,s o l v i n gt h em o d e l ,a n dc h e c k i n gf o re x c e s ss u p p l yo f
single men. If this is positive we are done; otherwise we increase V R
SM until excess supply equals zero.
5C a l i b r a t i o n
We now put the model to work to measure the importance of marriage-market prospects for unmarried
fertility and to assess the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of shocks to marital behavior. We calibrate the
model to the 1970s because, as we saw in the empirical analysis (Table 3), single women with children
were much less likely to marry, an eﬀect that has faded away in the 1990s data. The procedure consists
of choosing a set of statistical targets, choosing functional forms, setting values for the parameters
of the model, solving the model for the given values and functional forms, simulating a cohort of
women in the model, and comparing model statistics from the simulation to the statistical targets.
The parameters can be divided into three sets; “ﬁxed” parameters, whose values can be pinned down
directly from empirical observations or convention, “normalized” parameters, those that will be held
ﬁxed at arbitrary values, and “free” parameters, whose values will be set so as to minimize the distance
between the targets and the relevant model statistics.
The statistical targets are the probit predictions, from Table A1, of the birth and marriage proba-
bilities for unmarried women at age 25, and the birth and divorce probabilities for married women at
the same age. These targets are listed in Table 5(a). Because of the small sample size (2379 unmarried
women in the 1973 NSFG) we must be careful to avoid basing targets on very small cells of respon-
dents, such as divorced women with 2 children, or worse, divorce rates of families with step children.
We therefore use the aggregate divorce rate and limit the targets for marriage and divorce to women
with at most two children.
5.1 Functional forms
The stochastic process governing marital quality consists of two components: a persistent component
q that follows a Markov chain with parameters ⇢q,  q , and a transitory component that will be log
normal with mean zero and variance parameter  ✏.
For non-sterile women, the probability that a child will arrive next period is assumed to be a
declining function of contraceptive eﬀort, which is modeled as a utility cost ⇥
 
⇡F
i
 
to the household.
Therefore those who prefer to have a child will exert zero eﬀort. Let the fertility probability at zero
eﬀort, for a woman of marital status i be ˆ ⇡i. For fertility-cost parameters (⌘1,⌘ 2), the eﬀort-probability
14frontier is given by:
⇥
 
⇡
F
i
 
= ⌘1
0
@ 1
max
⇣
0,
⇡F
i
ˆ ⇡
⌘⌘2   1
1
A (18)
. The main implications of this functional form are: 1) eﬀort smoothly approaches zero as fertility
approaches the maximum, and 2) eﬀort tends to inﬁnity as the fertility probability tends to zero, and
3) the elasticity of the fertility probability is decreasing in ⌘2.
The utility ﬂows generated by diﬀerent household types are parameterized as linear functions of
the number of children. Thus married households without children receive utility ﬂow ↵M and single
households without children receive utility ﬂow ↵S. The ﬁrst child increases utility by ↵0
W,f o rs i n g l e
women, and by ↵0
W + ↵0
H for married couples. The arrival of additional children increases utility of
single households by ↵1
W and that of married , if the child arrives inside the marriage, by ↵1
W + ↵1
M.
The marginal eﬀect of an additional child born previous to the marriage is ↵1
W + ↵2
M;t h i sr e p r e s e n t s
the utility penalty associated with step children. The interpretation of the diﬀerentials ↵
j
M between
married and single life include the impact of children on the husband, as discussed in the introduction,
but also allow for women’s preferences for raising children in a married household, perhaps for other
reasons than the husband’s preferences, such as increased resources or some less tangible beneﬁt of
having the father present.
5.2 Parameters
5.2.1 Fixed Parameters
As in Regalia and Ríos-Rull (1999), the probability   of exiting the active state is set so as to replicate
the average number of years a woman is fecund. Sommer (2008) reports the fraction of women who
are fecund at each age between 16 and 44, using an interpolation of estimates by Trussell and Wilson
(1985). This results in a total of 20.45 fecund years per woman, so we set   =0 .0489.
These ﬁxed-parameter values are shown in Table 4(b). We set   =0 .96, the standard value for
annual frequencies in the macroeconomics literature; in models with savings, this value ensures that
the risk-free interest matches the US long-run average of 0.04.
The curvature ⌘2 in the eﬀort-fertility frontier is set to 0.1. See the discussion section below regarding
the diﬃculty of identifying an empirical analog for this parameter. At an interior solution, letting  V
be the (negative) gain from having a child, the optimal fertility is given by
⇡
⇤ =ˆ ⇡
⌘2

 ⌘1⌘2
 V
  1
⌘2+1
(19)
. This means the elasticity of fertility with respect to  V declines to zero as ⌘2 increases.
155.2.2 Normalized parameters
The values of some parameters are ﬁxed arbitrarily. Thus the divorce cost is set to 2, and the variance
parameters ( q,  ✏) of both the persistent and the transitory quality shocks are set to 1. This implies
the support of the persistent quality is [ 1.62,0,1.62]. The utility ﬂow of married couples with no kids
is set to 2, and the entry cost   to 1. These are classed as normalizations, because the values can be
changed without aﬀecting the overall results; the calibration procedure will reset the values of the free
parameters to restore the behavior of the model. The probability of marriage, conditional on matching,
also appears in the table. This was implicitly set to pz =1in the theory discussion, and remains so
in the calibration. Lower values will be used in the comparative statics section below to identify the
impact of frictions in the fertility decisions. The values of these parameters are listed in Table 4(a).
5.2.3 Free Parameters
The eight remaining parameters, also listed in Table 4(a), are set in the standard way: we identify a
list of target statistics from the 1973 NSFG, and the parameter values are set so as to minimize the
distance between these targets and the corresponding model statistics. The targets consists of marriage
and birth rates by marital status and number of children, a well as the average divorce rate, for the
1969-72 period in the survey. We use the predicted values for 25-year old women who have graduated
high school but not attended college, based on the Probit regressions reported in the empirical section
of the paper (Tables 3 and A1 for unmarried women, and Tables A2 and A3 for married). These are
compared to the simulated statistics for women in their seventh year , which, since we label the initial
year age 18, corresponds to age 25.
5.3 Simulation
Taking the parameters as given, we solve for the model’s stationary steady state using the recursive
strategy outlined in the previous section. For computing convenience, we keep the state space of the
model relatively small: we set K =3and Nq =3 . The computation starts from an initial guess of
the market-clearing vector   and the value V R
SM of being a single man, then solves for the optimal
behavior conditional on these guesses. The optimal behavior generates, via the implied steady-state
distributions, a new market-clearing vector  , which allows us to update the value V R
SM .W e r e p e a t
the procedure until convergence.
The model statistics are generated from the simulation of a cohort of women, starting at age 18.
The model statistics therefore reﬂect the model’s stationary steady state at a given set of parameter
values. The simulation is in turn based on the decision rules generated from the model’s equilibrium
16decision rules, evaluated at the current parameter-value guesses. Although the model solution generates
steady-state distributions of women, these are for active women only; inactive women are not tracked
by the model, hence the recourse to simulation.
In the simulation, women start out active at age 18 and eventually become inactive (sterile), ac-
cording to the constant-hazard process described in the model section. In this way the simulation
translates the model solution into a distribution by age, even though age is not a state variable in
the model. The cohort size is set to N =1 0 ,000 women, and the simulation follows each woman for
27 years, to correspond to the 18-44 age group. The initial conditions at entry are marital status and
number of children. These are set to match the average for 18 year olds in 1973; according to the March
CPS, 14% of women aged 18 were already married. For each woman, the realizations of the stochastic
processes governing marriage, fertility, divorce are given by 27 iid draws of a uniform random variable
of dimension ﬁve9. The aggregate statistics are then computed by pooling the observations over the
entire population, over all ages, while the targets are based only on the 25 year-olds.
6R e s u l t s
The benchmark values for the eight free parameters are shown in Table 4(a). As discussed in the
functional forms section above, the marginal utility of children is negative, in order to generate eﬀort
in reducing fertility. The “Men’s utility” less parameter is positive; this simply means that married
couples are less averse to fertility than are single women. The negative eﬀect of step children of course
is required to match the lower marriage rates of single mothers; otherwise the fact that they are worse
oﬀ as singles than non-mothers would generate a higher marriage surplus and hence higher marriage
rates. The persistence of marriage quality is set to 0.524; this was required in order to match the
divorce rate, given that the divorce cost was ﬁxed. The utility bonus for being single was -0.511; this is
the main systematic utility gain from marriage, which is otherwise driven by the match-quality process,
which delivers a utility bonus of 1.62 to good marriages.
The ﬁrst column of Table 4(b) shows the nine targets, the second the model statistics (the third and
fourth columns, labelled ’1995’, will be discussed in the next section). The average deviation between
model and target statistics is 8%, the largest being the birth rate for single mothers, which is 5.6%
annually in the NSFG and 6.5% in the model. The birth rate for unmarried women without children is
1.9% in the data and 1.7% in the model, a 10% deviation. There is no reason to believe that a closer
match is not possible; but previous calibrations (not reported) with reduced precision delivered similar
9This corresponds to one realization for each of the following events: getting married, marriage quality, divorce,
fertility, and exit from active status.
17results, so it seems reasonable to proceed with these values.
The aggregate statistics for the full 18-44 group are shown in Table 5. There are four reasons one
that these can diﬀer between model and data, even with a perfect calibration: 1) the model calibration
does not target women with more than one child, 2) the model does not allow for fertility of women
with 3 or more children, 3) the calibration ignores women who are not aged 25, and 4) the simulation
assumes a stationary distribution, while unmarried behavior in the early 1970s, as shown by Ventura
(2009), was already changing relative to 1960 and earlier. Nevertheless, the ﬁrst two columns show
that the model delivers reasonably accurate values for the fraction of women married (74%) and the
average birth rate (15%). It does sharply underestimate the share of fertility due to unmarried women
(6% instead of 10%), the fraction of families with kids from two or more fathers (2% instead of 6%) and
the fraction of children in single-mother households (6% instead of 13%); overall the model delivers a
picture of an economy dominated slightly more than reality by nuclear families.
Table 6 shows the decision rules for fertility and the marriage probabilities, conditional on being
active. The eﬀects of marriage quality on feretilit are seen to be small. Married couples with no children
always want children, so they have the maxmum fertility rate, 0.3. The shaded squares in panel 6(a)
show families with no step children; these always have lower fertility than same-size families with step
children; for instance active families with two children have a birth rate of 0.19 if none of the children
are the husband’s, but this declines to 0.12 as the number of the husband’s children increases. In
table 6(b) we see a marriage rate of 0.41 for active women without children; given that they have no
children, women are much less likely to be active in the simulation, so high marriage rates are required.
Women with one child marry at rate 0.18 and with two children at rate 0.096. The table also shows the
impact of fertility on marital prospects; the surplus is 1.79 for women without kids, declining to 1.21
for women with two kids; furthermore the (unconditional) probability that the woman gets the surplus
is 10% for women without children and declines to 0.04% for women with two kids. The marriage rates
of women with more than two children are zero, an artifact of setting K=3, which reduces the gains
from marriage for these women. Since unmarried women with more than two children are such a small
fraction of the population in the 1970s, this simpliﬁcation seems justiﬁed.
6.1 Comparative Statics
To clarify the behavior of the model, we now explore the impact of varying some of the free parame-
ters. The premise of the model is that marriage and fertility decisions are connected through marital
prospects, so it is useful to see how fertility responds to parameters that aﬀect marriage directly, and,
conversely, how marriage rates respond to parameters that aﬀect fertility decisions.
18In Figure 5, we increase the slope ⌘2 of the contraception-eﬀort frontier from 0.1 to 1.2 (the bench-
mark value being 0.39). One reason that this is interesting is that contraception eﬀectiveness did change
over time with the advent of the contraceptive pill in 1960 and liberalization of abortion in the 1970s.
Panel (a) shows that the eﬀect of reducing the marginal cost of contraception is, not surprisingly, to
sharply reduce the unmarried fertility rate. In the context of the model, this would not be a good
explanation of rising unmarried fertility. Panel (b) shows the aggregate birth rate declining, again not
surprising. Increasing contraceptive eﬀectiveness does however generate marital decline. In Panel (c)
we see signiﬁcant eﬀects on the marriage hazard. Finally panel (d) shows that the unmarried share
of birth rates fall as ⌘2 falls, as does the fraction of mothers who are unmarried, but the absolute
magnitude of the response is very small, ranging from roughly 1% to 5%.
In Figure 6 we increase the utility bonus ↵S associated with single life from -0.58 to -0.46; the
benchmark value is 0.51 . Obviously this will generate a decline in marriage rates, and this is shown
in Panel (c), where marriage rates decline from above 0.3 to zero. The critical observation is that the
unmarried share of fertility increases, as shown in panel (d) from 0.025 to about 0.94. This is partly
due to a decline in the share of women who are married, but, as in the data, the birth rate to single
women rises signiﬁcantly too. Panel(a) shows the birth rate to unmarried women with no children rises
from zero to 0.08, and that for mothers from 0.03 to 0.08. The annual birth rate nevertheless declines,
as unmarried fertility remains below that of married women.
Figure 7 shows the eﬀect of varying the divorce cost dC.I nt h eb e n c h m a r km o d e lt h i si ss e tt o2 . 0 .
It is generally accepted that divorce costs fell from the 1960s to the 1970s, but it is not obvious how the
1990s compare to the 1970s. We see in panel (a) that reducing divorce costs causes unmarried birth
rates to rise slightly for unmarried mothers, from 0.018 to 0.22, but this is partially oﬀset by a stronger
decline in the birthrates of unmarried mothers, from 0.06 to 0.04. Overall, annual birthrates decline
quite sharply, as shown in panel(b). This is driven by the decline in marriage rates of non-mothers, as
shown in panel (c), from 0.25 to 0.22. The share of unmarried fertility in birthrates therefore increases
overall, as shown in panel (d), as does the unmarried fraction of single mothers.
Finally in Figure 8 we see the eﬀect of reducing pZ, the probability that marriages are allowed
at a given moment, which we call the marriage completion rate. As pZ falls below 1, the matching
frictions increase relative to the benchmark model. This is a diﬀerent way to index the value of marital
prospects. In panel(a) as the friction increases, unmarried birth rates increase; the eﬀect is strongest
for non-mothers of course, as they are the ones for whom these prospects are most important, so their
birthrates converge to those of the mothers. Nevertheless, the aggregate birth rate falls, as the fraction
of women in marriage declines to zero by pZ =0 .2 as it is no longer worthwhile for men to pay the
entry cost. The birth eﬀects level oﬀ as soon as this point is reached. It is clear from this experiment
19that marital prospects are the main mechanism in the model for explaining the fact that unmarried
mothers have much higher birth rates than non-mothers.
6.2 Age Proﬁles
While age is not a state variable in the model, it is possible of course to track age in the simulation,
and so the lifecycle proﬁles over this age interval can be traced and compared to the analogous proﬁles
in the data. Figure 9 shows the marriage and birth age proﬁles for unmarried women based on the 1973
NSFG, which were ﬁrst shown in Figure 2. It also shows the proﬁles from the Benchmark simulation.
The model proﬁles for the marriage rate of single mothers and for the birth rates of unmarried non-
mothers are remarkably close to the NSFG proﬁles, but panel (a) shows that the model series for
marriage rates of unmarried non-mothers starts too high and declines too quickly. This suggests that
abstraction from aging is not the problem in itself, but rather it is abstraction from an activity that
competes with matching at early ages, such as human-capital accumulation.
The birthrate proﬁles are relatively close to the data. In panel (b) we see that birthrates to
unmarried mothers fail to fall quickly enough but the model series for non-mothers actually lies on the
NSFG series for about half of the proﬁle. Panel (c) shows that for married couples the series for both
mothers and non-mothers are relatively close.
Overall, the model does a ﬁne job of approximating the age proﬁles for birth rates as well marriage
rates for unmarried mothers. Extending the model to include education would certainly help depress the
marriage rates of the younger women, but may make it harder for the model to match the relatively
high unmarried birth rate for these women. On the other hand, extending the model to allow for
pre-marital sex could delay marriage while maintaining the high rate of unmarried births.
6.3 Experiment: Marriage Prospects
An important aspect of the model design is that it is possible to vary taste parameters that aﬀect
marriage and divorce rates without directly aﬀecting the utility of having children. In this section
we exploit this feature by resetting three parameters to match the 1990s values of three targets: the
marriage rates of women without children, the marriage rate of women with one child, and the average
divorce rate. As with the benchmark calibration for 1973, the targets consist of the predicted values
for age-25 women without college education, derived from the probit estimates in Table 3. We then ask
to what extent the change in marital prospects associated with declining marriage rates can account
for the observed increase in the birth rates to unmarried women.
The three parameters are: the utility of single life, the eﬀect of step children on the married utility,
20and the cost of divorce. The new values are shown in column 2 of Table 4(a). and the target and
model statistics are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4(b). The shaded cells in the table correspond
to statistics that were not targets. To hit the 1995 targets required the negative eﬀect of step kids on
married utility to shrink from -.05 to -.008, the contribution of single life to utility to grow from -0.511
to -0.487, and the cost of divorce to increase 11% from 2 to 2.2210.
The eﬀect on fertility of unmarried women is striking: birth rates for non-mothers increase from
0.017 annually to 0.045, mirroring the increase observed in US data.
Some of the other changes in non-targeted statistics also appear remarkably similar to their coun-
terparts in the data: marriage rates of women with two children, for example, rise from 8% annually to
12% annually in both model and data. The birth rate for married women with 1 child rises from 19%
to 21% in both model and data. Other non-targets, such as the birth rates to married women with no
children or two children, remain constant in both model and data. Where the model might have done
better is in accounting for the rise from 5.6% to 9% in unmarried birth rates for women with one child;
in the model this declines slightly, from 6.5% to 5.3%.
Table 5 shows that the changes in the aggregate statistics for the model also mirror the changes
observed in the US. The fraction of women married for instance fell from 74% to 48% in the model,
and to 53% in the data. The fraction of children in single-mother households rose from 13% to 22% in
the data, and from 6% to 28% in the model. The share of fertility accounted for by unmarried women
rose from 10 to 30% in the data, and from 6% to 26% in the model. The fraction of families with both
step-children and father’s children rose from 6% to 10% in the data and from 2% to 8% in the model.
Thus the model results suggest changing marital patterns could potentially explain all of the rise in
unmarried birth rates.
7D i s c u s s i o n
One sense in which the design of the experiment above may have biased the result towards ﬁnding a
large impact of marital prospects is that we have treated all women as identical ex ante.I tm a yb et h a t
unmarried women who have children were less likely than others to marry anyway. Does omitting this
heterogeneity exagerate the impact of marriage prospects? Note that even in this argument the fertility
arises from weaker marital prospects. Therefore it is not clear whether our model is exagerating or
10The reason divorce costs increase is that when marriage rates decline, divorce rates, if marriage quality is iid, have
to rise. The calibrated persistence (0.55) appears insuﬃcient to overturn this eﬀect through higher quality of marriages.
It may be that increasing the cardinality of the support of the quality shock (currently set at 3) may help to increase
marriage quality, but we have not explored this.
21merely simplifying the channels through which the eﬀects occur. The estimates of Rosenzweig (1999)
suggest that the direct eﬀects of marital prospects on fertility are large, but his model is quite diﬀerent,
and so it is not possible to compare his values with the results here. We eagerly await the results of
future research to shed light on this issue.
The critical parameter for generating birth-rate responses to shifting marital prospects is the cur-
vature parameter ⌘2 in the eﬀort-fertility frontier. It should be stressed that in reality this frontier
comprises a number of margins that are not modeled explicitly here; most importantly perhaps the
margins for sexual activity, for contraceptive-method choice, and for abortion. Therefore “eﬀort” cor-
responds to, inter alia,f o r e g o n eu t i l i t yf r o ms e x u a la b s t e n t i o n ,t h ec o s ta n dd i s u t i l i t yo fc o n t r a c e p t i o n ,
and the risks and utility costs associated with abortion.
This paper found that marital prospects could explain why fertility of unmarried women was so low
in the 1970s, provided that ⌘2 was suﬃciently close to zero. Whether this is a plausible representation of
the actual eﬀort-fertility frontier would seem to require more explicit modelling of the fertility decision,
at a s kt h a ti so u t s i d et h es c o p eo ft h i sp a p e r . H o w e v e rt h ec u r r e n tm o d e lc o u l ds e r v ea sab a s i sf o r
such modeling . In Kennes and Knowles (2011) for instance, the sex margin for unmarried people is
added to the model, so that unmarried women choose whether to be sexually active; those who opt
for sex then choose how much contraceptive eﬀort to exert. That eﬀort-fertility frontier is therefore
easier to measure than the one in this paper, because it does not include the sexual activity margin.
Building on the theory presented the current paper therefore seems to be a logical route to answering
the questions raised by the transformation of the behavior patterns of unmarried women.
That an important component of this eﬀort is associated with the actual use of contraception is
suggested by a host of results from the health literature on birth control. It is well known that the
theoretical eﬀectiveness of birth control methods is much higher than their measured eﬀectiveness in
use. Trussell, Hatcher, Jr., Stewart, and Kost (1990) for instance estimate the failure rate of the pill
under “consistent and correct use” to be one tenth of one per cent in the ﬁrst year of use, while that
of the condom would be 2% and that of the diaphragm 6%. Reviewing recent studies, however, they
ﬁnd typical condom failure rates of 12%, of the pill of 3% and diaphgrams 18%. It turns out that users
make mistakes, to which the public-health response has been intensive campaigns to ensure women are
well-informed regarding usage. In a recent editorial column in the journal Contraception,Glasier and
Shields (2006) argue from the results of a host of empirical studies that information has no impact on
eﬀectiveness. User “mistakes” are therefore much more better explained by the theory that “consistent
and correct use” requires user eﬀort. If avoiding mistakes requires eﬀort, the rate of eﬀectiveness will
depend, inter alia, on the incentives to avoid pregnancy.
It is now nearly twenty years since the NSFG wave of 1995 studied in the paper. Since that time,
22cohabitation has become increasingly important as an alternative or a route to marriage. This suggests
another route for extending the analysis presented here, by adding a margin for co-habitation, perhaps
even a separate set of matching markets. The timing of events suggest that far from being a cause of
the decline of marriage, cohabitation is rather a symptom of that decline which could be analyzed by
putting more structure on the options for unmarried women in the model.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
The results demonstrate that the greater importance of marital prospects in the 1970s than in the 1990s
may be suﬃcient to account for the lower birth rates of unmarried women at the time. We exploited
the fact that unmarried mothers marry at a lower rate than non-mothers to calibrate the eﬀect of
marital prospects in the matching model. Although the exercise sheds little light on why marital
patterns changed, the comparative statics exercises suggest an important role for shocks that increase
the utility of single life. A possible candidate explanation for this change, the arrival of highly-eﬀective
contraception for single women, is explored in Kennes and Knowles (2011), which extends the current
theory to the analysis of sexual activity of unmarried people.
Our quantitative results are not meant to be deﬁnitive but rather should be taken as illustrations of
the usefulness of our approach; the presence of children has been ignored in most analysis of the marriage
market, but our results conﬁrm that the interaction between marriage and fertility is signiﬁcant. The
contribution of our model is to allow repeated opportunities to remarry and to have children; to get
there we abstracted from important features explored in related papers, such as aging, human-capital
investment in children or the impact of means-tested government transfers. There are also important
features of marriage, such as the margin between cohabitation and marriage, that are ignored by both
the current paper and the bulk of the related literature. However it is clear that the approach used
here can be extended to deal with these and other features of marriage and fertility.
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AS o l v i n g t h e A s s e t E q u a t i o n s
In this section we derive the coeﬃcients of the linear asset-equation systems that deﬁne the value
functions. Recall that q 2 Q =
 
q1,...qnq
 
and that the probability of the ﬁrst shock in a marriage
being qi is f (qi;ˆ q), where ˆ q 2 Q is the same for all new marriages.
We write the divorce probability, before the current realizations (q0," 0) of marriage quality are
known, as:
⇡
D
k,km (q)=
X
q02Q
f (q
0;q) ("
⇤ (k,km,q
0))
, where "⇤ (k,km,q0) refers to the optimal divorce rule deﬁned in the model section of the paper.
The probability that a single woman with k children marries is
µk ⌘ pz [1   !0 ( k)]
⇥
1   ⇡
D
k,0 (ˆ q)
⇤
, where pz 2 [0,1] ,ap a r a m e t e rd e n o t i n gt h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tm a t c h e dc o u p l e sa r ea l l o w e dt om a r r y ,
generalizes the model slightly to allow for market-frictions. When we solve the level-k system for
k<K,w ea s s u m et h a tw ea l r e a d yk n o wt h es o l u t i o nf o rt h ek +1system of asset equations. The
system at k = K is relatively easy to solve because with fertility assumed to be zero, there are no
transitions to higher k.
A.1 Single Female
Let the probability that a single female obtains the marriage surplus be
pS (k) ⌘ pz [1   !0 (k)   !1 (k)]
⇥
1   ⇡
D
k,0 (ˆ q)
⇤
The ex ante value of being a single female with k kids is:
V
E
SF (k)=V
R
SF (k)+pS (0)S (k,0)
26, where S (k,0) = Y E (k,km, ˆ q)   V R
SF (k)   V R
SM denotes the surplus.
By the deﬁnition of V R
SF (k), we can write :
V
R
SF (k)=˜ d1 +   (1    )
 
1   ⇡
SF
k
 
V
E
SF (k) (20)
, where the terms in ˜ d1 are known11:
˜ d1 =
 
1   ⇡
SF
k
 
uSF (k)+⇡
SF
k uSF (k +1 )
 ⇥
 
⇡
SF
k
 
+   (1    )⇡
SF
k V
E
SF (k +1 )
. Plugging this back into the deﬁnition of V E
SF (k) we can write:
V
E
SF (k)=a11V
E
SF (k)+a13Y
E (k,0, ˆ q)+d1
where
a11 =   (1    )
 
1   ⇡
SF
k
 
[1   pS ( k)]
a1j =
pS ( k) if qj =ˆ q
0 if qj 6=ˆ q
d1 = [1   pS ( k)] ˜ d1   pS ( k)V
R
SM
.
A.2 Child-Less Marriages
Consider a married couple with no children. We write the divorce probability of a marriage with
realization q0 as  ("⇤ (k,km,q0)) and the ex ante divorce probability, given previous realization q,a s
⇡
D
k,0 (q)=
X
q02Q
 ("
⇤ (k,km,q
0))f (q
0;q)
.Recall that the divorce cost is denoted by  .The value of a new marriage where the bride already has
k children equals the sum of two components: the value if the marriage stays intact, and the value if
the marriage ends:
Y
E (k,km,q)=
X
q02Q
[1    ("
⇤ (k,km,q
0))]f (q
0;q)Y
R (k,KM=m| ,q
0)f (q
0;q) (21)
+⇡
D
k,km (q)
⇥
V
R
SF (k, )+V
R
SM    
⇤
(22)
11⇥ and uSF are parameterized functions, ⇡SF
k is conjectured, and V E
SF (k + 1) was solved for in the previous step.
27Assuming the marriage survives the divorce stage, the value of the marriage, before the fertility real-
ization is known, is
Y
R (k,0| ,q
0)=EU
M (k,q
0)+  (1    )EY
E (23)
, where
EU
M (k,q) ⌘ q +
 
1   ⇡
MF
k,0 (q)
 
uM (k,0)
+⇡
MF
k,0 (q)uM (k +1 ,1)   ⇥
MF  
⇡
MF
k,0 (q)
 
represents the expected ﬂow utility this period, and
EY
E =
⇥ 
1   ⇡
MF
k,0 (q
0)
 
Y
E (k,0,q
0)
⇤
+   (1    )⇡
MF
k,0 (qi)Y
E (k +1 ,1,q
0)
is the expected continuation value.
Using (20), we can write (21) as the sum of the continuation values without births as married and as
single plus a pre-determined component dj+1 that consists of period utility ﬂows and the continuation
values with births:
Y
E (k,0,q i)=a
k,km
i+1,1V
E
SF (k)+
X
q02Q
a
k
j+1,i+1Y
E (k,0,q j)+dj+1
where
a
k,km
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D
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 
1   ⇡
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k
 
a
k
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⇤ (k,km,q j))]f (qj;qi)  (1    )
 
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 
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k
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k
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D
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 
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R
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 
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0;q)EU
M (k,q
0)
d
k,km
y,j+1 ⌘
X
q02Q
[1    ("
⇤ (k,km,q
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MF
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.
A.3 The rest of the value functions
Now that we have computed the value system for single women and newly-weds, it remains to compute
the values of single men V E
SM (k) and the values of marriages with husband’s children present, (km > 0).
These are straight-forward. First, for the single men,
V
E
SM (k)=V
R
SM + !0 (k)pz
⇥
1   ⇡
D (ˆ q)
⇤
S (k,0)    
28.We use this to update V R
SM when solving the model.
Consider an ongoing marriage where the bride already has k children of which km  k are the
husband’s.
By assumption, we know the solutions for k +1 , so the only unknowns are
 
Y E (k,km,q i)
 
qi2Q,
where km > 0.
The system to solve is (15), with coeﬃcients B1k =[ bij] , where
bij = f (qj,q i)
 
1   ⇡
D
k,km (qj)
 
  (1    )
 
1   ⇡
MF
k,km (qj)
 
and B0k =[ di], where
di = ⇡
D
k,km (qi)
⇥
V
R
SF (k, )+V
R
SM    
⇤
+EU
M (k,qi)+e  ⇡
MF
k,km (qi)Y
E (k +1 ,k m +1 ,q i)
.N o t e t h a t t h e t e r m V R
SF (k, ) is known from the solution to the previous equation (14) with
km =0 .
A.4 Distributions
A.4.1 case 1: k =0
We now derive the coeﬃcients of equation (16) representing the law of motion for the masses of women
at k =0 .
Single Women The law of motion for single women with k =0includes the exogenous arrival rate
  of new singles as well as the ﬂow of newly divorced child-less women:
N
0
F (0) =   +( 1   )
 
1   ⇡
SF
0
 
"
(1   µ0)SF (0) +
X
q2Q
⇡
D
0,0 (q)M (0,0,q)
#
, where S0
F (0) is the fraction of the population next period consisting of childless single women. We
can therefore write the law of motion of the child-less single mass as
N
0
F (0) =   + a11NF (0) +
X
q2Q
a1,q+1M (0,0,q)
, where
a11 =
 
1   ⇡
SF
0
 
(1    )(1  µ0)
a1,q+1 =
 
1   ⇡
SF
0
 
(1    )⇡
D
0,0 (q)
29Married Couples The ﬂow out of the married childless state includes both fertility and divorce,
while the only ﬂow is from marriage of childless singles:
M
0 (0,0,q j)=0 (qj)
"
f (qj, ˆ q)pz (1   !0)NF (0) +
X
q2Q
f (qj;q)M (0,0,q)
#
where M0 (0,0,q0) is the fraction of women next period who are both childless and married, and
0 (q) ⌘ (1    )[1    ("
⇤ (0,0,q))]
 
1   ⇡
MF
0,0 (q)
 
. We can therefore write the law of motion of the mass of child-less marriages as
M
0 (0,0,q j)=aj+1,1NF (0) +
nq X
i=1
aj+1,i+1M (0,0,q j)
where
aj+1,1 = 0 (qj)pz
 
1   !
0
0
 
f (qj, ˆ q)
aj+1,i+1 = 0 (qj)f (qj,q i)
.L e tC1k =[ ai,j]. The vector of constants (16) is C0k =[  ,0,...0].
A.4.2 case 2: k>0,k m > 0
Once the system at k  1 is known, it is easy to compute the steady-state distribution for M (k,km,q)
with km > 0 as the ﬁxed point of equation (17). This is particularly easy for km > 1 because the only
inﬂow is from M (k   1,k m   1,q), whereas for km =1 , we must also allow for inﬂows from NF (k   1).
To represent this inﬂow, we deﬁne a pre-determined term g0
k,km (qj):
g
0
k,km (qj)=
8
<
:
0
k,km (qj)f (qj, ˆ q)pz
 
1   !k
0
 
NF (k) km =1
0 km > 1
, where

0
k,km (qj)=( 1   )[1    ("
⇤ (k   1,k m   1,q j))]⇡
MF
k 1,km 1 (qj)
represents the probability that a married woman with realized state (k   1,k m   1,q j) will remain
married and have an additional child. Now we can write the pre-determined part of the ﬂow into the
system as
gj+1 (k,km)=g
0
k,km (qj)+
0
k,km (qj)
X
q2Q
f (qj;q)M (k   1,k m   1,q)
30for any km 2{ 0,1,...k}, the law of motion is:
M (k,km,q j)=
1
k,km (qj)
X
q2Q
f (qj;q)M (k,km,q)+gj (k,km)
, where

1
k,km (qj) ⌘ (1    )[1    ("
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 
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k,km (qj)
 
.
In terms of equation (17), the coeﬃcients D1k,km =
⇥
1
k,km (qj)f (qj;qi)
⇤
,a n dt h ev e c t o ro fc o n s t a n t si sD0k,km =
⇥
g1 (k,km),...gnq (k,km)
⇤0 .
A.4.3 case 3: k>0,k m =0
For each k>0 with km =0 ,w ec a na l s oc o n s t r u c tal i n e a rs y s t e ms i m i l a rt ot h a tf o rk =0,e x c e p t
with ﬂows in from the population with k   1 kids.
Singles The result of the previous section means that the inﬂows to single status from married can
be decomposed into a part with km =0and a pre-determined part with km > 0.
For k>0, the ﬂows into N0
F (k) are from:
1. singles with k   1 children who didn’t marry and then had a baby:
d11 ⌘ (1    )⇡
SF
k 1 (1   µk 1)NF (k   1)
2. singles with k children who didn’t marry and didn’t have a baby:
(1    )
 
1   ⇡
SF
k
 
(1   µk)NF (k)
3. married with k   1 children who divorced and then had a baby:
d12 ⌘ ⇡
SF
k 1 (1    )
k 1 X
km=0
nq X
i=1
⇥
⇡
D
k 1,km (qi)M (k   1,k m,q i)
⇤
4. married with k children who divorced and did not have a baby:
 
1   ⇡
SF
k
 
(1    )
nq X
i=1
⇥
⇡
D
k,0 (qi)M (k,0,q i)+d13 (qi)
⇤
, where
d13 (qi) ⌘
k X
km=1
⇡
D
k,km (qi)M (k,km,q i)
31. The law of motion for single women is:
N
0
F (k)=a11NF (k)+
nq X
i=1
a1i+1M (k,0,q i)+d1
where
a11 =( 1    )
 
1   ⇡
SF
k
 
(1   µk)
a1i+1 =
 
1   ⇡
SF
k
 
(1    )⇡
D
k,0 (qi)
and
d1 = d11 + d12 +( 1   )
 
1   ⇡
SF
k
 X
q2Q
d13 (q)
Married, km =0 For married women in households with no kids from the husband, the ﬂows into
M0 (k,0,q i) are:
1. From married with same number of wife’s kids:
k (qi)
nq X
j=1
M (k,0,q j)f (qi,q j)
2. From single women with the same number of kids:
k (qi)f (qi, ˆ q)pz (1   !0 (k))NF (k)
, where
k (qi)=( 1   )
 
1   ⇡
MF
k,0 (qi)
 
(1    ("
⇤ (k,0,q i)))
. The full equations, written in terms of the linear system (16) are:
M
0 (k,0,q i)=↵i+1,1NF (k)+↵i+1,j+1M (k,0,q j)
, where
↵i+1,1 = k (qi)f (qi, ˆ q)pz (1   !0 (k))
↵i+1,j+1 = k (qi)f (qi,q j)
. Therefore the coeﬃcients C1k =[ ai,j] and the constant terms are C0k =[ di].
321970s 1990s
Fraction married                            0.74 0.53 -28% Census 1970/2000
Fraction of kids in single mom households   0.13 0.22 69% Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years Old: 1960 to Present
Fraction of mothers unmarried               0.19 0.25 32% Census 1970/2000
Fraction of kids living with both Parents           0.82 0.62 -24% Census 1970/2000
Share of fertility due to unmarried women   0.1 0.3 200% NCHS Data Brief  No. 18  May 2009
Fraction of families with mixed kids        0.06 0.1 67% Census 1970/2000
Average birth rate                          0.18 0.08 -56% National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 48, No. 16, October 18, 2000
Table 1: Changes in Aggregate Marital Indicators . Census computations based on women aged 18-44.
Statistic
Data
% Change Source
34NoKids SinMom NoKids SinMom
20.49 30.847 23.187 31.03
(2.210) (3.151) (5.411) (4.462)
0.11 0.054 0.312 0.138
(0.675) (0.102) (0.366) (0.227)
0.00039 0.006 0.002 0.005
(0.043) (0.034) (0.038) (0.047)
0.00011 0.00035 0.032 0.087
(0.023) (0.008) (0.139) (0.185)
0.474 0.12 0.533 0.244
(1.076) (0.146) (0.394) (0.283)
0.938 0.563 0.843 0.739
(0.520) (0.223) (0.287) (0.290)
0.006 0.216 0.067 0.557
(0.172) (0.185) (0.198) (0.327)
0.00247 0.006 0.006 0.007
(0.107) (0.036) (0.061) (0.055)
High-School 
Diploma
Prevously 
Married
Marriage 
Rate
Variable
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics. NSFG 1973 and 1995 
samples of single women aged 18-44. Sample for 1973 is 
reweighted to compensate absence of unmarried women 
without children.
1973 1995
Age
College 
Degree
Birth Rate
Cohabiting
Attended 
College
35birth mar birth mar
-5.603 -4.183 -4.012 -4.666
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
0.758 -0.407 0.226 0.048
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.031 -0.094 -0.060 -0.018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
0.061 0.151 -0.037 -0.051
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.016 -0.225 0.024 -0.123
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
0.377 0.201 0.115 0.139
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1.073 -2.957 -0.058 0.054
(0.005) (0.586) (0.001) (0.000)
0.051 0.671 0.194 -1.588
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004)
0.194 0.081 0.026 -0.088
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
-0.004 -0.002 0.142 0.169
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.014 -0.010 -0.003 -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.107 -0.112 -0.325 -0.282
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
0.442 1.371 -0.177 0.042
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.184 0.030 -0.200 -0.040
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
-0.394 0.273 -0.268 0.008
(0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
Previously Married
Table 3: Probit Estimates of unmarried women's monthly marriage 
and birth rates. Samples from the NSFG, 1973 and 1995 waves.
Age Squared
Age x BA
Attending School
HS diploma
College
College Degree
Age
1970-73 1990-95
Intercept
1 Kid
Cohabiting
2 Kids
3 Kids
4 Kids
5 Kids
Variable
36Value
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
0.96
0.05
0.30
0.22
0.10
1973 1995
-0.05 -0.008 Effect of Step-Kids on Marriage Output
0.02 Womens utility for kids, intercept
-0.01 Mens utility for  kids, intercept
-0.035 Women's utility for kids, slope
0.005 Men's utility for kids, slope
0.524 Persistence of match quality
0.394 Fertility-choice cost slope
-0.511 -0.487 Utility bonus for  singles
2 2.226 Divorce Cost 
Calibration
Parameter
Table 4(b): Free-Parameter Values for Calibrated Models. Parameter values for 
1995 are fixed at the 1975 values, except for those listed in the 1995 column.
Maximum rate of unmarried fertility
Effort-fertility curvature parameter
Table 4(a): Normalized and Fixed Parameter Values in Benchmark calibration.
Maximum rate of Married Fertility
Parameter
Normalized Parameters
standard deviation of persistent quality shock
probability that marriages are allowed to occur
divorce cost
standard deviation of transitory quality shock
male entry cost into singles market
utility flow of child-less marriages
Fixed Parameters
Discount factor
Exit rate into inactive status (sterility)
37NSFG Model NSFG Model
0.23 0.249 0.112 0.135 Marriage  Rate, non-mothers
0.13 0.111 0.126 0.117 Marriage rate, mothers of one child
0.091 0.086 0.118 0.118 Marriage rate, mothers of two children
0.227 0.218 0.224 0.228 Birth Rate, married couples with no kids
0.187 0.188 0.215 0.21 Birth Rate, married couples with one kid
0.098 0.107 0.1 0.1 Birth Rate, married couples with two kids
0.019 0.017 0.046 0.045 Birth rate, single women with no kids
0.056 0.065 0.09 0.053 Birth rate, single women with one child
0.02 0.021 0.049 0.043 Divorce Rate
Data Model Data Model
0.74 0.74 0.53 0.48 Fraction married                           
0.13 0.06 0.22 0.28 Fraction of kids in single-mom households  
0.82 0.92 0.62 0.65 Fraction of kids living with both parents          
0.10 0.06 0.30 0.26 Share of fertility due to unmarried women  
0.06 0.02 0.10 0.08 Fraction of families with mixed kids       
0.18 0.15 0.08 0.13 Average birth rate                         
1973
Table 5(a): Calibration of Marriage and Fertility in Benchmark Model. NSFG statistics consist of 
Age-25 predictions from estimated age profiles, controlling for educaiton and cohabitation etc. 
Unshaded cells correspond to calibration targets.
1995
Table 5(b): Results from NSFG Surveys and Benchmark Model Calibrations. Based on population 
of women aged 18-44.
1973 1995
Statistic
Statistic
38012
0.035 0.082 0.163
q Wife's Kids 0 1 2
0 0.30 -- --
1 0.30 0.21 --
2 0.19 0.16 0.12
0 0.30 -- --
1 0.30 0.20 --
2 0.19 0.16 0.12
0 0.30 -- --
1 0.30 0.19 --
2 0.19 0.15 0.12
Kids Marriage 
Probability
Men/ 
Women Surplus
Probability
Wife Gets 
Surplus
Y_mar VE_SF
0 0.39 0.53 1.79 0.10 22.04 10.70
1 0.15 0.18 1.31 0.01 20.04 9.03
2 0.08 0.10 1.21 0.00 19.35 8.44
3 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 -- 8.20
Kids to Date (Parity)
Single
Table 6(a): Fertility rates of active women in benchmark model.
Table 6(b): Marriage rates of active women in benchmark model. Excess supply of single 
males = 0.092.
Married Husband's Kids
-1.62
0
1.62
39Marr-73 Birth-73 Marr-95 Birth-95 Marr-73 Birth-73 Marr-95 Birth-95
21 0.301 0.021 0.117 0.072 0.122 0.169 0.103 0.134
22 0.304 0.022 0.122 0.069 0.124 0.175 0.108 0.128
23 0.305 0.022 0.126 0.065 0.125 0.178 0.111 0.122
24 0.304 0.022 0.128 0.061 0.124 0.177 0.113 0.114
25 0.301 0.021 0.130 0.056 0.122 0.173 0.114 0.106
26 0.296 0.020 0.130 0.051 0.120 0.166 0.115 0.098
27 0.289 0.019 0.129 0.046 0.116 0.156 0.114 0.090
28 0.280 0.017 0.127 0.041 0.111 0.143 0.112 0.081
29 0.269 0.014 0.123 0.037 0.106 0.129 0.109 0.073
30 0.257 0.012 0.119 0.032 0.100 0.113 0.105 0.064
31 0.243 0.010 0.114 0.028 0.093 0.097 0.100 0.056
32 0.229 0.008 0.108 0.024 0.086 0.081 0.095 0.049
33 0.213 0.006 0.101 0.020 0.079 0.066 0.088 0.042
34 0.196 0.004 0.093 0.017 0.071 0.052 0.082 0.035
35 0.179 0.003 0.086 0.014 0.064 0.040 0.075 0.029
36 0.162 0.002 0.078 0.011 0.056 0.029 0.068 0.024
37 0.145 0.001 0.070 0.009 0.049 0.021 0.061 0.020
38 0.128 0.001 0.062 0.007 0.042 0.014 0.053 0.016
39 0.111 0.001 0.054 0.005 0.036 0.009 0.047 0.012
40 0.096 0.000 0.046 0.004 0.030 0.006 0.040 0.009
41 0.082 0.000 0.039 0.003 0.025 0.003 0.034 0.007
42 0.068 0.000 0.033 0.002 0.020 0.002 0.028 0.005
43 0.056 0.000 0.027 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.023 0.004
44 0.046 0.000 0.022 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.019 0.000
Table A1: Predicted Age Profiles for Marriage and Child-Birth. Based on probit regression estimates on 
single-woman samples from NSFG 1973 and 1995. To compensate lack of never-married non-mothers in 
sample design, 1973 sample re-weighted using 1970 census.
Age
Non-Moms Single Moms
1973 1995 1973 1995
40NSFG Model NSFG Model
-2.9897 -3.1434 21 0.2818 0.2761 0.2188 0.2309
(0.003) (0.003) 22 0.269 0.2741 0.2094 0.2291
-0.0048 0.0598 23 0.2533 0.2695 0.1999 0.225
(0.000) (0.000) 24 0.2331 0.2622 0.1903 0.2185
-0.1004 -0.0186 25 0.2112 0.2525 0.1806 0.21
(0.000) (0.000) 26 0.1921 0.2405 0.1709 0.1994
-0.2567 -0.3201 27 0.1747 0.2265 0.1611 0.1872
(0.000) (0.000) 28 0.1602 0.2108 0.1511 0.1735
-0.0160 -0.0552 29 0.1458 0.1937 0.1399 0.1587
(0.000) (0.000) 30 0.1305 0.1757 0.1284 0.1432
0.0793 0.0276 31 0.1158 0.1571 0.1168 0.1273
(0.001) (0.001) 32 0.101 0.1383 0.1051 0.1115
0.1619 0.0036 33 0.087 0.1199 0.0936 0.096
(0.001) (0.002) 34 0.0735 0.1022 0.0824 0.0813
0.0951 -0.0247 35 0.0616 0.0855 0.0718 0.0676
(0.001) (0.002) 36 0.044 0.0702 0.0628 0.0551
0.1054 0.1190 37 0.0299 0.0565 0.0541 0.044
(0.000) (0.000) 38 0.0198 0.0445 0.0454 0.0344
-0.0025 -0.0028 39 0.0139 0.0343 0.0368 0.0263
(0.000) (0.000) 40 0.0079 0.0258 0.0283 0.0196
0.0237 0.0327 41 0.0056 0.019 0.02 0.0143
(0.000) (0.000) 42 0.0048 0.0136 0.0117 0.0101
-0.2405 -0.1408 43 0.0038 0.0094 0.0036 0.007
(0.002) (0.000) 44 0.0021 0.0064 -0.0044 0.0047
-0.0513 -0.0789
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.0719 0.0123
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.6788 -0.9559
(0.003) (0.001)
Table A2: Probit Estimates of married 
women's monthly birth rates. Samples 
from the NSFG, 1973 and 1995 waves.
1973 1995
Non-Moms
Age
Table A3: Predicted Age-Birthrate profiles, based on Probit Estimates 
of married women's monthly birth rates.  HS diploma
College
College 
Degree
Variable
Moms
Cohabiting
Previously 
Married
Age
Age Squared
Age x BA
Attending 
School
Intercept
1 Kid
2 Kids
3 Kids
4 Kids
5 Kids
41Figure 1: Marriage Rates by Birth Cohort. Based on US Census,  1980, 2000 and 2010 
waves.
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42Figure 2(c): Women never-married, never given birth; attended college. Census 
1970 versus reweighted version of NSFG samples.
Figure 2(b): Women never-married, never given birth; College graduates. 
Census 1970 versus reweighted version of NSFG samples.
Figure 2(a): Women never-married, never given birth; dropouts. Census 1970 
versus reweighted version of NSFG samples.
Figure 2(b): Women never-married, never given birth; High-school graduates. 
Census 1970 versus reweighted version of NSFG samples.
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43Figure 3: Single and Cohabitants in the 1995 NSFG. Annualised marriage and birth rates 
per single woman.
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Figure 4(b): Estimated Age Profiles for Marriage Rates; Single 
Women with one child.
Figure 4(d): Estimated Age Profiles for Birth Rates; Single 
Women with one child.
Figure 4(a): Estimated Age Profiles for Marriage Rates; Single Women 
with no children.
Figure 4(c): Estimated Age Profiles for Birth Rates; Single women without 
children. 
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45
Figure 5(a): Effect on unmarried birthrates of changing birth-control costs; 
benchmark value =0.39.
Figure 5(b): Effect on aggregate birthrates of changing birth-control costs; 
benchmark value =0.39.
Figure 5(c): Effect on marriage rates of changing birth-control costs; 
benchmark value =0.39.
Figure 5(d): Effect on unmarried shares of  birthrates and mothers of changing 
birth-control costs; benchmark value =0.39.
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Figure 6(a): Effect on unmarried birthrates of changing unmarried utility; 
benchmark value =0.55.
Figure 6(b): Effect on aggregate birthrates of changing unmarried utility; 
benchmark value =0.55
Figure 6(c): Effect on  marriage rates of changing unmarried utility; 
benchmark value =0.55.
Figure 6(d): Effect on  marriage rates of changing unmarried utility; 
benchmark value =0.55
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Figure 7(b): Effect on aggregate birthrates of changing divorce costs; 
benchmark value =2.0.
Figure 7(a): Effect on unmarried birthrates of changing divorce costs; 
benchmark value =2.0.
Figure 7(c): Effect on  marriage rates of changing divorce costs; benchmark 
value =2.0.
Figure 7(d): Effect on unmarried shares of birthrates and of mothers of 
changing divorce costs; benchmark value =2.0.
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48
Figure 8(a): Effect on unmarried birthrates of changing marriage friction; 
benchmark value =2.0.
Figure 8(b): Effect on aggregate birthrates of changing marriage friction; 
benchmark value =2.0.
Figure 8(c): Effect onmarriage rates of changing marriage friction; benchmark 
value =2.0.
Figure 8(d): Effect on unmarried shares of births and mothers of changing 
marriage friction; benchmark value =2.0.
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49Figure 9(c): Married fertility rates in the benchmark model. NSFG series based 
on Probit predictions from 1973 wave; model series based on 1973 benchmark 
simulation.
Figure9(b): Unmarried fertility rates in the benchmark model.  NSFG series 
based on Probit predictions from 1973 wave; model series based on 1973 
benchmark simulation.
Figure 9(a):  Marriage Rates in the benchmark model.  NSFG series based on 
Probit predictions from 1973 wave; model series based on 1973 benchmark 
simulation.
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